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Section 1: Introduction
Ideally, science and knowlcdge belong togetl-rer as project and product, truth
or the approxirnation thercof being the rcstilt of scrupulously Íbllorving correct
proccdures for formulatirrg and testing hypotheses and interpreting results. In thc
collrse of history, a special class of human beings wlto devote their days to research
in universitics and research institutcs has erlcrgcd, people who arc expected to bc
tlic model citizens of thc city of knorvledgc: scicntists. Their behaviour has become
the almost cxclusive rescarch objcct of episternology, of thc history o1'scicnc
and of thc sociology of sciencc. Radical reprcscntatives of thc last discipline, united
tunder the flag of the so-called Strong Prograrnrnc in the Sociology of Knowledge
(SPSK), argucd that scientists in rcal liÍ-e are far retnoved frorn thc episterlological
ideal: their rcscarch questions would be guidcd by unscientific rnotives (politics,
powcr, status and rnoney), their activities airncd at creating desirablc results, their
cxpcrir-ucnts and idcas lnessy, their rnemories sclcctive, their altpreciation of-
alternativc cxplanations and theories ncgligiblc or hostile, their discoveries oftetr
pLrrcly accidcntal (cf. c.g. Barnes 197J, Latour 1987). In receut ycars, post-nrodcrrt
thcorists have gonc even 1'urthcr than SPSK by claiming that truth itself is a non-
-issuc. Ift,rman practices, including scientific rcscarclt, lvould bc ruled by 
- 
or
worsc, be involr"rntary cffccts of 
- 
'discourscs', scts of thcories ancl nornrs tltat
dctcnt-rinc rvhich issucs, questions attd acts arc correct or ittcorrect, rclevattt or
irrelevant, scnsible or l-ncaninslcss. Trr.rth is a function of interprctation, of 1he rvay
in r.vliich 'significar-rts' (phcrromena) arc 'siguified': the rules of discourses detcnnit'tc
lvhat truth is, within the contcxt of a givcn discoursc (for a classical account scc
Foucault 1966). Therc woulcl be no rvay of rising above the discourses, of-r-utiting
or of criticising thern: a mctadiscoursc rvoulcl simply be arrotltcr discoursc crcating
its or,vn ncr,v reality. So l'ar, r'lo post-urodcnr thcorist has evcr bectr ctlbarrassed
by thc paradoxical obscrvation that postr-noclcnrisnr must itsclf be otrc of thcsc only
contcxtual ly mcaningl'ul discourscs.
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I;or dccadcs ttorv. thc cprcstions laisccl by SPSK and l)ostuloclcnrislr havc
clot-tiinatcci thc agcniia ol'cpistcrn,rlog,r'. It sccnrs to irc rclativclv casy, to luts\\,cr
SPSK's critiquc by poiutiuÍr to thc dislinction ht--tri'ccrr thc contc\t of'ciiscovcry ancl
thc cot-ttcrt oÍ'.iLrstilication. I-ct it bc tnrc thlt Ncri,ton sr>l Iris iricas irborrt gr;r.,'it1,
ll'orn his cncoutttct''uvitlr itn airplc; lct it irc lrLrc lhat Kókulc got his ircst iclcu ilr
a drcat't-t, lct pcniciilin 1'''c thc rliscovcrv of'un cxtrultcly, nrcss\ scicnlist ilt un
c>tlt'curcly clirt;, llibolalor),: ict it bc truc tltat thc ltgcttcla ol'ai-ltdcltric rcscarch thcsr:
days is a product oÍ'opporturristic political clccis;iorr t:ilrking. [-ct all this bc ti'ut:
as long as.r is rur cxpcrinrctit tlrat can irc rcpcltccl i,rnrlcr iidcal. cleurr) lirlioi'ulcl"',,
conclitit'ns, an intct"prctltior.t or a thcory thlt c:an lrc rccon:;trrrctcri or;lr.ld..<i to thc
body ctf cxisting knou,lcdgc using cot'rcct proccclurcs - irs lr;ng as u,hnt lurs hccrr
discovcrcd catr bc 
-justiÍiccl. it u,ill :;till bc tnrc^ soocl or lcliablc knorvlcil!:c.
Postrnodcrnisttt is lc-ss casy to trcat. crirctl.",bccalrsc it lrrnrs thc idclr oí'.1
contcxt ofjustiÍication against scicncc. Í1. is thc cliscotrrsc oÍ'rr purticrrlar scicrrti['ic
disciplinc that 'pt'oclttccs' truth: its .^ollcction r-.Í- rri)'tlrs (ttisiinu knori'lcclgc) thll
help Lrs irrtcrprct plicnclurctra anrl locatc tircin irr tiris largcr'Ír'anrcr"'ol'l<. anrl its
taboos itnd con-tnratrclurcnts (cpistcrtrolosic:al c:r'iltria) that coiitrol thc pcrcclttion oÍ-
ticlv itrfonnatiort ancl its i.tcccss to thc rnincJs of intcrplctcrs. J{c:ricc. thc cltistcnrologist's
proposition that si:icn1illc 1ruth is scicrrliÍlc trLrth nlr nrattcr irorv it u,ai; cliseovcr"ctl
Ilakcs pcrt-cct scnsÈ u'itliin thc cliscoulsc ol' rriristcn.rology btrt lro!'lc u,hatsoci,cr'
rvithin that of SPSK. bccitusc SPSK is not irrtcrcsicci in thc r-urtrrlc oí'scicntiíic
knorvlcclgc bttt, patliologicaliv, in thc natrrrc o1'scil'rcLr lt:"i ,r socill ltloccss oÍ'(rc)producing attitudcs anri cocles o1'bcha.,'ror;r ï1,,'íhc sallc tol<crr. r'cul
cotnt-trunication ilnlong thc cliscourscs oÍ-scicrrtiÍlc riir,ciplirlc,\ Llrrrl hciri'ccn thcrn irrrr-l
thosc of non-acadcn-ric liÍc is irlpossiblc: cliÍ-l'crcnt rliscoLirscs ititcrltlct thc Sill"lrr'
proposition or pltcrtonrcnon accorrling to thcii'cu'n nilc:;. Thc griicc-r anrl thc
astror-totncr livc in diÍlcrcnt u,orlcls";rnrl ncvcr thc t',r'air.r shall rnrc1.
Il'postuodcrnistr is i'ight, thcn rihril is knrlu'lr:clg1c in,rrrc contcxt nccti not
bc thc sanre thing itr anothcr contcxt, anti \\,or.cic. rvhat is irLrc in onc: c:ontcxt c:ar"r
bc ttntrttc in anotlicr: tlter propositit.rtr ihal. rnanliind lurcl upcs hi1',,c conuron linccstcirs
would bc as trtrc itl biologl, its it woltlci lrc biatltrtt Itt-rttscltsc itt íLrtrclattrcntriist
Christianity. So is cournrunicatiorr really inipossiblc. is thc clrrcst lur univcrsallv
valid knorvlcdgc futilc'l
Onc of thc fcr,v rcciccttring qrralitics oí'ptli;trlotlcrrri:;nr is ihat it rcntincis rrs
of thc oftcn ncglcctccl firct tliat knorvlcclgi: rs not ploclrrccii irr iiclcicrnic circlcs oniy.
Thc difÍ-crcncc bctu,ccn acaclcnric know'lci'lgc irnii Lno.,vicclge clscu'hcrc is, or so
tradition says, that acadctric-s pllrsuc linr:*'lcilgc Íbi lhc:-al.,r: rrf krtou,lcclgc, r.r,hcrcas
othcrs ltave morc practical purposcs irl nrinil. ri'hich rnight ineiucc thcnr to bc lcss
scicntifically sitrccrc than thc idcal scicntist" llr'c rcniuriis l;'c iri crdcl hcrr:. I--ir:;tlv.
knowlcdgc is in lact sclclorn pursLlccl tirr its ou,n sal<c" Apart fronl 1hr- fuct tlurt
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thc avcriisc rcscitrcltcr u'il1 llncl it ctrfÍlcult to cortvincc íl so\jcnlleltt thaf his
rcscat'cll shotrlcl bc llnancccl cxactlv bccausc it rvill not havc altv pt'actical usc --
c\/cll thc itcadcmic hinrsclf sclcJonr bclicvcs iir thc intrinsic valuc of lino'uvleclgc. tlc
Itritv L-ciicve in thc intrinsic valuc o1'tlrc ltttr,rrrít of knotvleclgc as valrrablc in itself-,
bLrt this cjL'cs not Íïll.v cxltiain thc actuul gcncsis Lurrl clevcloltnrcrrt of his rcscarci1,
li[<c rr'ily ollc] scicntist invcstigatcs onc topic anci a scconcl nirot[cr', or rvhy olc
rcscarclt qucstiotr rvoulcl lcad to atrothcr. At this I-roint. thcrc is 1o ha11 i1 Í{ivipsin to SPSK 
-- wc rrrc aftcr all onli; talkinq about thc contcxt o1. cliscctl,cr-\,.
Scconcllv, the (in)f?ttrrotrs tliviclc Lrctr.vc^cn ïheorv anci lrracticc, scicncc anci thc rcal$'orld. tnav ltcip to cxplairt rvltv nhcnorncnu arc obscrvcd clil'fèrcntly in bot6 ri,alks
oí'litc\ or in othcr cliscoLrrscs, why sonrc arc intcresting in onc antl otircr-s in anothcr
anrl rvhy clifJ'ercnt issLtcs itl'c cotrsidcrcci lclcvlint in di1ï'crcnt contcxts - but. as
Ihopc to sltott', that salnc cliviclc cíun.rot rnal<c hnurvleclgc rporc or lcss tlrc
clepcnding olt rvhich sidc of tltc divicic onc livcs.
If the- cpistcmologist's 1'!:1liv to SPSK is corrcct. it sIoLrlcl rrot prattcr Soiv
knor'i'ledgc is rl-raclc ot'cliscor,'crccl 
--- rvitat nratft:rs is w,hi:thcl it can bc rcconstn-rctccl,
hypothcticailt'. as thc logical rcsult oÍ'corrcctlv upplying the rigSt.justificatio'
1lt'occclttrcs uttdcr iclclrl ctircLttttstlll.iccs in arr iclcal rvollti.'l'hus. il'thc c1;istcptoiogist
is right, trLrth is trLrth rcgarcllcss oÍ'thc conicrt. \\riictlicr trutI rs r.r,(.í)s//i.\,r(/ i.ls
st"tcit ls a totalll'cliÍ'f-crclrt cltlcstiolt So lirr'. thc ilo"itltror-!crnist cap still irgrcc ri,,ith
thc cllistcttlologisl. Iiis claint airtrcars to [rc sintply,a rcstatcntcpt gf'ti'rc litttcr.'s
llositiort. scicntiÍlc trtrth rct'uaitrs sciclrtiÍlc tr"rrth tiorl a sciu-ntillc itoilt oÍ'vicp, lip4
can at tltc salltc tinrc bc rcligior.rs ulttrttth Í'iont ;r rciigrous ltoint ol'r,icri,. Bgt hcrc
thc cllistclrlologist catrtrot gcl along: lclr hinr. thcrc rtrLrst bc a tnrth abuyc 11rl bcyg1c1
tltc boittlclarics ol'ccltttexts, Nolv i1'r.vc cart shciu' rhat thcre is. or carr bc. at lcltst
otlc ittstatlcc of cotlrtrlltuicatiott bctwecn a scicntillc ancl a non-scicntillc cliscoursc
rvlterc lloth agrcc ott tltc salttc statrclarcls for a phcrronrcnon both rrr-rcicrstapcl as t1rt5,
thclt thc llostn"rodcrtlist's ltvltothcsis ri,ould allllcur to Llc rcÍ'utctl. It is pty iltcltion
to do prcciscly this.
For this lltlrllosc-, I shall discuss cnvironnrcntal policy (sccrion 2). ancl Iusc
thc tertrl policf itt a strict sctisc. In a broacl scnsc it is the rcasorrccl clcyclopptcrrt
ancl application of lllcalts to prc-givcn cncls- - a <JeÍlnitiop tlilt ilcludcs alltost
cvcry fbnl-r of litttnatl bchaviottr fl'otl laundry clcaning to scierrcc. Ip a strict scltsc,
policy is ali activity pcrfbrmed cxclusivcly by political actors through adp"ripistrativc
organisatiott-s. Although l dcfinc etrvirontncrntal policy in this strict seuse, rvc slioyld
kccp the broad versiot-t in rrincl; as we shall sec latcr, it cap heip gs unclcrstancl
the rolc of cpistcrnology irt scicncc and practicc. Thcrc is po reasop r,v5y
spccifically ent'ironmentul policy rvould bc intercsting 
-- 
it just happcns to bc
a Í'ield I atn Íarriliar rvith and onc that ofÍcrs arnple opportr-rnity to illlstratc
try claiurs.
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In the developrnent and implernentation of policy, knowledge is an instrutlent
and the absence oi knowledge an obstacle. Now comlrlon sense tells us on the onc
hand that policy rnakers should have an interest in accurate information, i.e., itr
scientific knowledge, whereas on the otl-rer policy tnakers have their own agenda
a'd their own criteria for sllccess, criteria according to which the 'solution' of an
environrnental policy problen-r rnay well differ frorn solving an environucntal
proble'r as such. If we consider policy in light of the first perspective and assutle
ihe availability of adequatc knowledge, it could be as totally uninteresting for an
epistemologist as perfect science 
- 
it would be a purely technical affair. Policy
rlaking is only epistemologically intcresting in so far as knowledge is absent or
insecure 
- 
in ro fur as it is a way of not-knowing what we do not knor,r'. It is
for this reason that this will be an essay on episternology but not as wc know it:
I intend to discuss ways in which lve do nol knolv what we do rrol kuow'
I Sope to s6ow, aurong othcr things, that the logic of the environurental policy
cliscoursc can forcc policy makcrs to dcal with cnvirontnental probler-ns as such.
Second, their logic Íbrccs thctu to rccognisc the absence of information as a
problen. Third, ábr.n.r of infbrnation can takc lnore Íbrms tharr that of a lack
àf e,npirical knowledge aione 
- 
in fact, it is inÍbmation of a tnoral and political
'ature 
that they rnost want. Fourth, it is in solr-lc rcspccts a lack of information
and irr others its presencc that justifies policy diversity, i.c., the crnploytlent of
ciiff-crent rathcr that'r similar policies.
In scctiol 3, I draw conclusions of tr,vo typcs Íiorn rny analysis of environtlental
policy. On the one hand, I discuss thc role of (non-)knowledge in policy and scicnce'
ancl conclude that the two can, do and shor-rld couturulticatc -- albeit uot becausc
tlis would bc rnutually advantagcolls, let alonc becausc it would realise the classic
Greck idcal of ulity of practice and thcory, but tncrely becausc the trvo need each
other i1 a relatior-r of rnutual cxploitation. On the othcr haud. I discuss scicncc
as a forrn of policy and argue, by altalogy, in sLrpport of scientific diversity,
Scncc also for an opcn, sceptic ancl sclf--critical cpistcrnology, i.c.,, scicntil'ic
diversity.
In scctiorr 4, I addrcss the implications of thc necessary rclation bet$'ccn
policy and sciencc for thc post-modern critique of- trr-rth. I shall ir-rtroducc a third
cli'rension lext to thc contexts of justiÍication and discovcry: the cot'ttcxt of
'-reaning. 
Without denying that thc dcvclopn-rent of sciencc, like that of policy, has
a' ethico-political background (thc context of discovery) and contcxt-depcrrdent
cl.fects (thc context of meaning) it still has an a priori clain-r to contcxt-indcpenclctrt
truth (coltext o1' justilication). I hope to show that thc post-rnodcnt critiqtte is
corrcct in onc rcspect, i.e., in its obscrvation that thc rules for attachiug tneatrirtg
to phcnolnena difÍer frour contcxt to contcxt, but this is hardly a llew theory. I
also Sope to shor.v that it wrong in another pcrspectivc, viz., iu couÍlsing thc
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meaning of a proposition in a given context and its 'cotlmunicability', its value
as an approxirnation of context*overarching validity. Consequently, there is still
rooln and a task Íor epistemology.
Section 2: Policv diversity
Environmental policies differ from context to context and country to country
(Weale 1992, Wells I996): there are direct and indirect tax policies, regulations
for producers, retailers and consumers in the Íbnn of prohibitions and duties,
inforrnation, propaganda, rewards and stigmatisation; there are policies at national,
sub- and international levels; there are political, private sector and so-called non-
-governmental organisations that irnplcment policies; there are end-of-pipeline and
source-regulating policies; there are policies aimcd at air, water or soil pollution,
at re- and deforestation, at atmospireric conditions, and so on and so forth. I shall
call this phenomenon policy diversity.
Some causes for the existence of policy diversity relate to the pararneters that
deterrnine how policy realms (like the European Union, states, communities) will
try to solve any policy problem: the political systerl, the regulatory systern and
the culturc. A second set of explanations is equally obvious: environmental
problems themselvcs differ frorn place to placc. Think of what it takes, just
infuritively, to see the sarne policy implementcd everywhere: political systems differ,
regulatory systerns differ, cultures differ; all that would have to bc neglected or
eliminated. We would all have to be confronted with thc same problern or sarnc
set of equally serious problerns 
- 
and the samc causes 
-, 
and we would all have
to interpret them in the same manner.
It is no wonder then that there exists such a thing as policy diversity. The
concrete fonns of policy diversity dernand explanation, the fact itself hardly doe s.
And it is in a sense virtually useless 
- 
not meaningless but useless 
- 
to ask if
policy diversity is a good or a bad thing, for the salne reason that we usually do
not bother to ask if life or death are good or bad things: it is useless in so far
as these things cannot be changed thernsclves but only, at best, the way we perceive
them. But policy diversity irnplies options, choices: instead of policy x, y could
have been chosen. One has to believe at least that, and one has to believc that
at least in principle, or else any invcstigation into thc way tltese and other
determinants influence thc choicc of policies would be as useless as asking if lifc
is a good thing. There is then really sofile sense and use in asking whether concrete
policies are good or bad 
- 
in morc formal terrns, under which conditions policy
diversity in environmental problerl solving can be evaluated positivcly or negatively.
It is this aspect of policy choice that I shall investigate in this section: the nonnative
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quality oÍ' ltolicics. Notc that nontrativc and nroral alc ltot thc sitlttc things; tlic
ntoral is btrt alt asllcct oÍ' thc rionrativc. Wc usc ltonrs to crraittatc ttcarll,
evcrything, Lrut rtrost oÍ- us clo not prinrarily cvaluatc the ordcr ol- thc allthabet or
a landscapc by its nroral n"lcssagc. that is. bv rvhat it sa1,s abotrt thc r.vay lvc shortld
trcat onc anothcr. I-lencc, alt in othcr rcsltcct:s or i-tvcrall 'qood'ltolicy is trttt
rtcccssarily a moral polic1,.
I shall, l-rrstly, tal<e a krok at standards for a good llolicy. As u,c shall scc,
whcther or not policy cliversity is a goocl thing dcpcncls to a largc cxtcrrt orr tltc
nature of policy itself and on thc quality of particular policics. Subscquurtly. I
cliscuss standards fbrthc'goodness'of diversity and asl< if therc arc also drawbac,ks
to policy diversity. Thc scction encls r.vith an ovcrall assesslrent of policy divcrsity
in environmental problem solving. My primary objcct at this lrorneltl is simply 1o
makc explicit solne of thc standards used (nrostly implicitly) in policy ntaking and
policy choices. In scctions 3 and 4, I shall rcturtr to the dceper cpistcrlological
questions raised by the argutnctit Íbr policy diversity.
Whcn is a policy good? When I considerecl this question and had ntadc a list
of thc criteria I could think of, I recognised for thc first time a fèeling oÍtcn ascribcd
to thc Dr. Nos of fiction, plotting to take over thc world: lny God, why do rve
leave such things in the hands of politicians instead of specialists? The critcria look
sin-rple enough, at first sight, but a lnere surfàce analysis is enough to shor.v that
evcly one of thcm raises questions about f'urthcr criteria and deeper questions about
deeper critcria, lcading us cver farther away fiorn policy as a tccl"rnical activity
to policy as thc conclusion of a philosophical discourse. The list I give herc is only
part of a far longer list I rnadc 
- 
and even that one was far fiortr complete. It
is divided in threc parts: Syntax, Scuantics I and Setlatrtics II.
The first part dcals r,vith criteria for what a logician rvould call 'a rvcll Íbrmcd
formula' 
- 
the purcly syntactical aspcct of policies, tltat is, regardless of rvhat
tl-rev are for. what thev do and what lttealts tltcy ttsc:
(1) there rlust be criteria for sllccess (otherwisc the whole idea of a good
policy vanishes);
(2) it rnust be possible for policy x or any policy to tneet thesc criteria (there
must exist lrreans to rcach the goals, i.c., efficacy urust be possible);
(3) policy x must actually meet these criteria of success (it rnust bc eÍfcctive)
(4) policy x must tneet tl-rese goals efficiently, that is,
Ga) either ffIorc efficiently than other alternativcs or(4b) it must be cfficient cnough, rise above a ccrtain tliniurutn level of
efficiency.
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Notc that syntactic critcriii taken by thcmselvcs tcll us virtually nothing about
i.vhcther or not a policy is cÍl-cctive or eÍïcicnt: the rnctastandards Íbr thesc two
Itavc to cottrc Íiom sotlcwherc clse. So rvc lnovc to Sernantics I.
Sctnantics I dcals with what I would call the objectivc or ernpirical critcria
for thc cluality of a policy, ils opposed to Scmantics II, which dcals with
norn-tittive critcria. It follows from our syntactical criteria I and 4 that therc
tnttst bc highcr statrdards. dcfinitc goals and ureans. And Íiom this in turn it
lollorvs that:
(5) thc initial situation n.rust bc adequatcly describcd:
(5a) thc problerr itsclÍ;
(5b) thc pliysical crrviror.u.ncnt of thc problclti;
(5c) thc political cnvironnrcnt of the problcnt;
(5d) thc policy/regulatory cnvironmcnt (ctc.);
(6) thc possiblc ntcans rtrnst bc adcquately dcscribed;(l) thc ot-rjcctivcs n.rust bc adcqr"ratcly dcscribccl.
(U) tltcrc is a stancJard Íbr adcqllacy: tmth (ref-crcrrcc theory, consistcncy
thcory) or thc altproxinration of trr,rth.
(9) thcrc is a dccisiort rulc 1'or thc choicc o1'rtrcar-rs.
Ottcc lttorc wc sec that lvc still clo not havc cnough critcria to asscss thc
qtrality o1'policics: we ncccl cvcn highcr stanclarcls to tcll us which decision rulcs
shotrlcl bc applicd. rvhich objectivcs to choosc ancl'uvliich thcory of truth to apply.
So rvc lttove to Sctnantics II for thcsc standards. In cliscussing Scrnantics II, I shall
ignorc thc issuc of theorics of truth. Thc inrportancc of thesc thcorics Íbr policy
ntakiltg lics not so ttruch in thc prccisc thcory to wliich onc adhercs, but in thc
{hct that scicntiÍlc knorvlcdge is in practicc always unccrtain, regardlcss of thc
thcory oÍ'truth. Unccrtainty can bc rccluccd ty Íirrthcr rcscarch and cxpcrinrcnts
but rvc can ltcvcr totally gct rid of it. As a rcsult, thc foundatiorrs on which policics
arc crcctcd arc rrot things callccl thcts but things wc should call probabilitics, and
probabilitics. as wc shall scc. cannot bc cvaluatccl órrl Íiont a non'nativc poirrt of
vicrv. Now back to Sentalttics II:
(10) thc objcctivc ntust lre tnoral:
(l0a) at lcast as goocl as othcrs, or
(l0b) tuitrintally good, as nrcasLrrccl by our lnorill stanclarcl(|l) thc ntcalts r-r-Lrst bc ntoral:
( lOa) at lcast as goocl as othcrs, or
(l0b) ruininrally good, as nrcasLrrcd by our morÍrl stiindarcl
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Now if the reader fecls that all this is rather abstract, I agrec. Lack of tirlrc
forces pc to forget about illustrations hcre, nor would they bc directly rclevant
to our subjcct. The one thing I want to point ont here ntore tharr anything clsc
is that policies arc by nature deeply nonlativc. I would argue that thc Syntax list,
Sen-rantics I and Sernantics II r,vill remain abstract as long as wc do not have thc
following, explicitly nonnative', thcories (still assuming that thc airn of cnvirotrtncntal
policy is to solve cnvironmental problems):
(1) A theory of the sustainablc cnvirot-tuent, wltich prcrstlllles:
(2) A thcory of the sustainable socicty, which presullles:
(3) A thcory of political Í-casibility;
(4) A theory of economic f'casibility;
(5) A thcory of social feasibility; and
(6) A thcory of risk evaluation; and all of thc abovc prcstlrllc:
(7) A tnoral theory of ends and trlcans.
That wc necd thc Íirst theory is obvious: rvithottt an iclea of hor.v natttre worl<s,
hor,v wc want it to work, rvhcn ancl rvherc, all talk of cfÏcacy and cfï-rcicncy is
rnearrilglcss. But tl'rerc is r"ro ouc turirlttc irrdisputablc theory of the sttstainablc
cnvironrlent becausc thcre is no singlc answcr to thc qucstiort rvhat a sustairlablc
epvironrler-rt looks likc (cf. Dobson 1995). If rvc kill off all ltuuans, the rctrtaitting
world will bc as sustainable as it can bc: tiaturc rvill tttallage orl its owll. Tltc tlorc
colulnol-l deÍlnitions of sustainability assuu-re that tltc prcseltce of htttratls is a
concliíig síne qucr rton of sustainability: the so-called Brundtland Rcport dcllrlcs
it authoritativcly as ensuring thc satisluction of presctrt treeds without ham"rirlg thc
irrterests of futurc gcncrations (WCE,D 1991 . 282). Dcfinitions likc thcsc arc 
-
and this is an unclcrstatencrrt 
- 
opcn to intcrprctatiorl (cÍ'. e .g. Bcckcrtltan 199'1).
If we want therc to be hunrans in thc rvorld, wc u-rust admit thc possibility of nlatly
scenarios. The worlcl could bc transfonncd into onc gigantic Ycllorvstonc Park, it
could be tumed into William Morris's drcam of England as a ltcrfect English
gardcn, or into a global copy of thc Ncthcrlancls 
- 
citics, grass. cows, grecnhouses,
grain and nothing clsc evcn into a u'orlcl-rviclc Manhattatt rvithout thc Park,
fcci o1 synt6etic food. All of tliesc arc inraginably sustainablc r,vorlds, altd llollc
of thcm rrectl bc unpleasant Íor all thosc rvho livc in thcm.
I,[ence, as long as we rvant hurlans to bc part oÍ'thc sustairlablc r,r'orlcl aricl
evcn if wc valuc the environment Íbr its orvn sakc, that is' indcPcudct]t of its
instrumcntal value to liurnans, wc nccd to cstablish rvhat hutrlans tlcccl atlcl rvatrt
- 
tlrus ,rvhat a sustainablc ,socieí.tt rvould havc to look likc. Ancl this brirtgs irl
elcr-pelts like ccononic sustainability (in othcr words. pllrc stlrvival) ittlci social
sustainarbilitv (survival as lnorc than rvorking poor). And all this rcquircs a thcot't'
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oÍ political feasibility: we lnay qllestion rvhcther existing political instittttions at'c
1'ït to transfonn socicty into a sr-rstainable society, but wltatever institutions lvc ltLtt
in thcir placc, a policy cannot succccd if rvhocver clesigns artd itlplert-rents it is not
recognised as lcgitirnatc. Morcovcr, society is likc a srnall ccosystctn witliin thc
larger global system, and politics in turn can bc scen as alt ecosystetrt within
socicty. All havc thcir own laws, nearly laws of traturc, thc Íbrcmost being that
'rvliat rnattcrs most is the irntnediate survival, on a clay to day basis, of inclividual
politicians and citizens.
Next, wc neecl a theory of risk cvaluatiorr, partly bccausc all scientiflc
knorvledgc is unccrtain, albcit to varying degrees, and partly bccause policies are
ltever cxclusivcly beneficial. They alr.vays involvc sacriÍlces: flnancial resourccs
that cor"rld liave bccn used in other ways, ccotrotric and social opportunities, attd
so fbrth. Onc rvay to rcpresent policy choiccs is in the lbntr of a cost-bcncf-rt
analysis. In such an analysis, rvc put cnvirounrcntal risks aud costs on the one sidc
ancl rcqnircd sacriÍlces ancl bcncfits on tlic othcr, and if thc sacriflccs arc strallcr
and if wc arc rational, wc choosc to do sourething about thc risks.
Nor,v lct us consiclcr hor.v lvc assess risks. Wc do not just say that 'thcrc is'
a risk ancl that 'thcrcÍorc' sonrcthing slioulcl bc cionc; iltsteacl, 'wc put a rvcight on
risks: sol'nc arc r,vorth taking, othcrs arc trot. And rvc asscss lltc valuc of whatcvcr
is at risk: a90oÁ chancc of onc singlc ant gcttiug killccl is usttally cousiclcrcd Íar
lcss intportant than a 20% chancc of a i0 Í'cct risc of tltc sea lcvcl. At lrrst sight,
oltc would say that wc evalr-ratc thc cost siclc, the cnvirotrttrental risk sidc, of a
policy as Íbllows:
a(risk)i'x c(costs of possible cffcct)'/
in ri,hich thc rvcighing Íactors a ancl ó dcpcncl olt ortc atrothcr. as do c attd d.
Wc havc, according to this fbrmula, onc standard to cvalttatc thc costs of say
pollr-rtion and another, inclcpcndcrrt 1l'onr thc- filrtncr, to cvalttatc risks as sttcli.
I-lcncc, if rvc put a high (dis)valuc on risks, lve- ltavc lnorc l'casolt to act
iri otlicr rvords: tlic grcatcr thc urrccrtaittty, thc grcatcr thc tlcccl Íbr ltlccar-ttiolt.
Enviroltntcntalists oÍicn rcf-cr to this idca as'tltc prccautionary principlc', itncl
opposc it to ivhat they sce as thc traditional attitudc of policy t'ttilkcrs, viz., tt'r
intcrltrct uncertainty not as risk but as alrscncc ol'coutradictory irtfbrmation. Ovcr
thc last tcn ycars, particularly sincc thc 1992 Urritcd Nation Clonltrcncc ot.l
Sustainablc Dc'"cloprncnt in Rio clc Janeiro. tltc 1'rt'ccautiolrary ltrinciplc has bcctt
irrtroducccl ilr'nrodcrn'cnvironurcntal policy as rvcll. Whilc thcrc sccl.tts to bc littlc
conscnsus alnoltg cnvirorrn-rentalists and nrocicrn policy ntakcrs olt ll tt.tol'r- pt'ccisc
lunnLrlation of tirc principlc (cf'. Jordan ancl O'Riorclan 1995, Francis 1996). thcv
clo agrcc that thc cxistencc of unccrtainty (in thcir casc, abotrt tltc crrvirottttrcttlltl
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cffccts of human actions) is enough to put thc onus of proof Íbr the acceptability
of potentially cnvironmentally dangerous activities on thosc wlto proposc such
activities.
That the precautionary principlc is a souttcl principle is a r.videly shared vicrv
but, I think, one that is basically incorrcct 
- 
as incorrect, in fact, as thc allcgccl
'traditional' conception of environrrcntal risks. It rnight seclr an acaderlic lroint
but just wait a rnornent Íbr the conscquences. First, considcr this: the lveight of
risks thernselves sccms to dcpcnd orr thc lvcight wc givc to thc obf ect of the risk.
hnaginc that all you have to do to protcct yoursclf against pickpockets is to rvcar
your wallct upside down; thc costs of doing this, the eflorts involvcd, arc rcally
negligible. Now a 50oÁ chancc of losing tcn pence usually does not incitc us to
take the salle or urorc precautions than a 5001, chancc of losing 500,000 pounds,
or a 25oÁ chancc, or cvcn a 5uÁ or loÁ chancc. Wc sinply do not find tlic risk
of losing l0 pence worth considcring 
- 
bccausc wc cíirc lcss about thc rnoncy,
and because we carc less about risks becuuse we care lcss about the moncy. Hencc,
risks arc cvaluated by onc and only onc starrdard: thc valuc u,c attach to possiblc
cffccts:
c(risk)1' x (costs of possiblc cÍï-cct)'/
in which ó and tl are 1ïnctions oÍ' c.
Now note the conseqllences of this vierv. In orclinary ciiscoLlrsc, environurcutal
probabilities are uscd in t'wo ways: llropone nts o1'cnvironmcntal policies arguc that
thcy arc risks and that sorr-rething should bc clonc about thcm becausc thcy arc risks.
whercas opponents of cnvironr-nenl.erl policics arguc that thcy arc LlncL-r'taintics uncl
that wc should at lcast rvait until u,c know urorc (cl. Wcalc 1992). Thc cl'l'cct o1'
my intcrprctation of risks is that probabilitics themselves count for nothing; thcy
havc no independent rolc. Flcncc, ilny appcal to thc conccpts of risk ancl unccrtainty
to either do sornethir-rg or do nothing arc mislcading and at timcs sinrply rhetorical.
What rnattcrs whcn rvc cvaluatc cnvironnrcntal policics is 1hc lirct that wc arc
certain or uncertain about cÍfccts. trut holv u,c rvcigh thosc cllects, how wc valuc,
say, a polluted ar-rd unpollr"rtccl bcach.
Ar-rd so wc collc to thc last rccluircrrrcrrt of goocl cnvirortt-uental policy: rvc
nccd a thcory of the good ends iind n-rcans, oÍ'rvhat is valr,iablc 
- 
not only to
dctcnlinc thc morality of me ans. nor only to ciroose thc r.vcights attacliecJ to risks.
but also to evaluatc conccptions o1'ccoloEical, social ancJ politrcal sustainatrility.
This is, neccssarily, u nroral thcclry: cvcn if wc u'onlcl olrt lbr a clcnrocratic or
majoritarian or in general positivistic thcory oÍ'rvhat is valuablc, lvc ri,ould havc
to cxplain why wc prefèr this positivistic thcory to niorc substarrtivc rnoral thcorics
- 
which is itself a rnoral qucstion.
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Irinally, notc that all thcsc theories defnc scparate conccptions of sustair-rability:
the set of ccologically sustainablc rvorlds is not idcntical with the set of cconorlically
sustair-rablc societies. which is not idcrrtical rvith that of socially, politically or
nrorally sustainablc societics. If thc sct of societics that rnect all thesc critcria is
cmpty, rvc ltavc a long scries of sccond-bcst rvorlds to choosc fion; if it contains
l'ttorc tltan otrc clcurcnt, a choicc betrveen flrst-bcst rvorlds. At any ratc, it is quite
unlikely that thcre is only onc ovcrall sustainablc rvorld 
- 
it is therefore cqually
unlikcly that thcre is only onc good crrvironrtrcntai policy.
Onc ttray ltow arglle that moral pluralism, i.c., tlie reason rvhy thcrc arc so
lllally conccptions of sustainability, can bc reducccl 
- 
but that, as a rrattcr of íàct,
is ncither true nor opportunc. It is not truc becausc ethical truth cannot bc proverr,
only assttttted, or iÍ'it could bc provcn might still not convincc, ancl because any
suggestiort that cthical trutlt can bc llrovcn is as valid as thc assun-rption that it
catrtrot. Hctrce, /'onc bclicves in morality, one shoulcl at lcast in principlc bc ncutriil
and at lcast in principle rccognisc as cqually worthy all sorts of theorics of thc
good, of thc good liÍ-c and of thc goocl cnvironnrcnt. Nor is it opportunc to try to
rcdttce tnoral pluriÍbnnity: it is a Íirct of liÍ-c, difllcult to changc, and attcmpts to
cltattge it scriously rcduce thc 1'casibility of cnvironnrcrrtal or other policies. (Sirrcc
this is perhaps not thc right placc to engagc in a clcbatc on ethical truth, I must
lcavc thcsc claiurs undefcnclcd.)
We havc secn that euvirotrtr-rcntal policics can clivcrgc fbr rtroral as rvcll as
cn-rpirical rcasous. But exactly lvhen and rvhy is ltolicy diversity goocl'/
Irirst oÍ- all, notc that lionr a singlc-niinclcdly syntactical point o1'vicrv,, tliis
cluestiort is irrclcvant. If all u,c carc about is cfÍlcacy, thc cÍÍccts of cnvirontrrcntal
policics, tltcn thc diÍ-fcrencc betrvccn a slcclgehanrmcr ar"rcl a Íïtting kcy as lrcans
to opcn a cloor is totally itntnatcrial. r\nd iÍ'all wc carc about is cfflcicncy, thcn
policy diversity is as likcly as policy sinrilarity to lcad to conÍlict. Iuraginc trvo
ncighbouring coutttrics trying to rid tlicrlsclvcs of air pollution by building highcr
chitntrcys so that thc wind rvill blorv thc Írlth arvay. If thc rvind bctwccn thc tu,o
blows Íiorn tlic Ílrst to the sccoucl couutry 50%,, o1'thc timc and irt revcrsc clircction
dr.rrirtg thc rcst of thc tintc, thc rret cÍ-Ícct u,ill bc zero'. thc tr,vo countrics mcrcly
cxchangc polh-rtiort. Frour thc syntactical point oÍ'r,iew thcn, lvhat rlattcrs is that
policics arc colnpatiblc, not that thcy arc clifl-crcnt or sin-rilar.
Ft'our a sclttiintical pcrspcctivc, thcrc arc thrcc clr,rstcrs oÍ'rcasons in làvour
o1-;rolicy clivcrsity. Firstly, thc lcarning cl'fccts: one utay cxltcct a clivcrsity oí'
policics to producc luorc knor,vleclgc alrout 1hc clficacy ancl cfÍicicncy o1'policics,
cvclt il' both lttcilt.ls and objcctivcs clillcr, and also lnorc knowlcdgc about thc
sctrlantical aspects of policies. To cxplain thc latter point: policics dcvcloltccl
'within' a cultut'c & policy X will not be too crcativ'c or unconvcntional; yct rvhat
lrappcns itr courttry X nray rvcll bc sonrcthing rvc in )' pcrhaps u,oulcl not havc
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thought of, for exarnplc all those beautiful free-urarket solutions the Auericatls
havc ilvented, tliings wc Europeans would probably nevcr have tltought of
ourselves. Notc, 6owcvcr, that lcarning c1Íècts do rcquire irtternational exchangc
of infomration, and notc thc similarity between biodivcrsity and policy divcrsity:
t6e rlore divcrsity (or so thc theory gocs), the greater the cltauces of sr-rrvival in
and adaptation to chartging circutlstauces.
Secondly, policy divcrsity can contributc to sustaiuability otr a far largcr scalc
t1a1 ccological sr-rstainability alonc: in the given context of a regiort, tlatiot-t,
whatevcr, it is Íàr nrorc likely than uniforn-rity to prodr-rce optirual strategies Íbr
cultural, ccouot'uic, social and political (etc.) sustair-rability.
T|irclly, r,v|ercas thc Íbnncr argumcnt focuscd on political or at least practiciil
fcasibility, therc is also a uroral argnnrcnt in fàvour of policy diversity: it allo'u'n's
a p-rultitude of conceptions of thc good lif-e and of the good ctrvirontr-rent to bc
rcalisccl, thss oltcring roorl 
- 
urore room at lcast than trrtifbrntity 
- 
Íbr tltc
recoglition of valuc pluralisn-r and thc rcalisation of individuals' cqually lvorthy
plals of liÍ-e. Notc, incicientally, tltat thcrc is a dil-fcrerlcc bctr.veeu practical
Í-casibility a1d lrorality: the n-rost or only Í-casiblc practical cttvirotrttlctrtal policy
cloes not have to bc thc bcst onc fi'onr a nroral point of vicrv. If ettce, cvcll if you,
t6e rcadcrs, would all agree olt sonre iclcal o1'a sustainablc society and I r,vatlt
soprcthipg clsc, purcly liypothctically spcaking bccausc I r.vould preÍ-cr thc Manhattau
typc of society over any othcr, thcn ncithcr your ltor lt-ly idcal will bc Í-casiblc;
tulless olc party lbrces thc othcrs to its knces, rvc will ertd up itt a scconci-bcst
world.
Yct therc arc clrawbacks to policy clivcrsity; it is not trnconditionally good.
It llakcs liÍ'c morc corr-rplicatccl, lbr onc. On a lnorc scriotts ttotc, policics can
contradict one anothcr or conrrtcract: insiclc a policy rcalttt. llolicy ,r lllay rcsrtlt
in thc ncgation of policy ,v -- but that is nrorc a ttrattcr ol'co-ttrclirlation. What
is worsc is tlat policy rcalnr X n-ray go Íor tlic Manltattatt tvltc of sr-rstainability
and ), fbr ycllowstonc park, each courrtcracting thc othcr throtr-Írlt bordcrcrossing
c1Ï-ccts. Moral pluralisrn is agood thing, cvcn as rcgarcls conccptiotls of strstairlability,
but lcrc it coulcl rcsLrlt in all parties bcing fl'r.rstratcd. Tlie implication is ttot
(lcccssar-ily) that thc tivo cannot cxist ncxt to onc anothcr or that ttnatlinrity is
rcquircc1, t6at thcrc should bc onc ancl no lrorc thatr ot"tc cortccption of sustainability
- 
t5c iprplicatio1r is that thc physical and political bordcrs of policy rcaltrls shotrlcl
not bc considcrccl as sacrosanct if rvc airtl lbr cfficacy.
Sccopclly, t[e division of tlic rvorld into policy rcalnrs lllay resttlt itr thc
cxtilction of, say, spccics.r or gcncrally in E1-lbct.r irr cotttrtry { a rcsLtlt that,
by t5c staldarcls of ), (rvhcrc EfÍ'cct,r docs not cxist or occttr) is ttnacccptablc or
i1-rptoral. This is 1ot a spccilic problcnr lbr cnvirotrttrctttal policy; thinl< of ltitttlatl
rig6ts violatiols of all sorts. In abscncc of a sr,rpcrior altcntativc to pcllitics, i.c..
134
EPISTEIIíOLOGY, I'OL\CY ÁIID DIL'EIISITY
ltcgotiations anci public debate, wc lray well have to rvalk the uncotr-rfortablc middlc
roacl betwcetr uncritical policy pluralisrn and uncriticisablc policy ur-rifonnity 
- 
if
only bccausc that seelns bcst in tertns of or.tr own chances of survival.
A last disadvantage is a special case of tlte fonner: tlte obstinacy of soulc
clvirolmcntal scientists or theorists r,vho clairr-r to have exclusive knowledge of
what sustainability is and requires, peoplc rvho rltn up against both fcasibility
problems and differences in conceptions of tlic good or thc good etrvirontt'rent. I
would like to repcat the point rnade (implicitly) abovc: there is no onc true allswer
to rvhat sustainability is or requires, sit-tcc it is a decply uortltativc conccpt: it
requircs prior agreelnent on how wc r,vould like the rvorld to look likc. And cvel'l
if this rathcr anthropoccntric view on ethics werc not tuorally defensible , cvcr-r if
therc are things that should bc done or prcvented despite the fact that no litturati
wants this 
- 
evclt then it is a fact of liÍ-c. Notc, by thc woy, that conscnslls alllong
át colrununity, say that of cnvironrncntal scientists, is tto guarantee of truth 
- 
all
opir-rion docs not become llore truc if thcrc iirc lttorc peoplc rvho believc irl it.
In sunrrnary: rvhether policy diversity is goocl or bacl is detcrr-nir-red by two
Íactors. In thc first placc, policy diversity tlust itsclf bc appropriate,, uot otlly or
rnerely because, and wherc and if, political, rcgulatory artd cr-rltr.rral dctert'uiuatrts
diÍf-cr. but also, or cvcn lxorc so, bccausc viervs of thc good, of thc good liÍ-c and
of the good cnvironment diffèr. Secondly, policy divcrsity is a positivc thing i1'thc
diversc policies thcr-nselvcs arc good, both in gencral by tlte star-rdards of syntax
and sernantics, ar-rd in particular if they iirc luorally justilicd, ttte attittg, otrce lllorc,
that they rccognise thc plurifonnity of opinions that cxists or-r thc good, thc goocl
liÍ'e and thc good environment. In short, policy cliversity is good if and only if it
is an adcquatc reply to moral plurilormity, otrc that respects rathcr thau restraitls
moral divcrsity.
Finally, lct rnc nrention two rclativcly inclcpcnclcnt rcasolls rvhy policy clivcrsity
is a good thing: Íirstly, becausc it may rctriud policy tnakcrs ancl crtvirontrletrtal
scicr-rtists of thc existencc of rr-roral uncertaitrty and binds thctl-t to inrpartiality
regarcling lif-c styles and visions of sustainability. Sccondly, bccausc of a sinrilarity
bctween bioclivcrsity and policy diversity. I clo not think I trccd to cxltlain in dctail
how unwisc it is, how risky, how bad for a spccies' chattces of survival, to
overspccialisc or, by analogy, to rcducc trunlbers attd kinds of policics. Diversiflcation
is indispensable in the pr-rrsuit of knowledgc atrd, ltetrcc, in thc sttrvival of tnaukitrd,
particularly of uran iu a frce and cqual socicty.
Froru olle's private point of vierv, tlieory of thc good, plar-r of lilè arlcl
conccption of sustainability, policy diversity tray not always bc t-nrixitnally e llcctivc
a1d cÍflcient. Ncvcrthclcss, if one admits fallibility, if otrc adrriits to trot having
cxclr,rsivc access to somc ultiuratc Trutlt, thcn it is, to qtrotc a Íàlnous closct libcral,
a good thing that 100 flowcrs blossotn.
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Scction 3: ScientiÍic diversitv
To ovcrsimplify tnatters a littlc: rvc have secn that good policy takcs arccourrt
of thc absencc of knorvledgc and of thc practical impossibility of discovcring
cotrclusive knowledgc in tlvo scnses, enrpirical ancl normative, and r.vc havc secn
that thc degree to which (a lack of) enrpirical knowledgc matters is zr moral lactor.
To bc lrore prccisc, is it thc aims and cnds of policy that dcterminc rvhich kincls
atrd aruounts of knowlcdge arc rcquired. Now all through thc last scction I havc
assuured that the airtr of cnvironu'rcrrtal policy rnaking is to solvc environmcntal
problerus; licucc, the kinds of normativc ancl moral theorics needed werc sultposccl
to be tltcories about society and crtvironntent.
In scctiou l, I ref-crrcd to this assumption Írs thc first pcrspcctivc or-t ltolicy
rttal<ing. I also tlctrtioned a seconcl pcrspcctivc: policy ntakcrs havc thcir ou,n
agenda, according to which solving an environurental ltroblcn-r may not alr.vays bc
thc bcst r,vay to solvc a policy problcnr. This is a nrorc cynical pcrspcctive olt policy
nraking 
- 
altd also onc a rcprcscntative of SPSK or ltostr-r-roclernisrtr would rvant
tus to Íbcus on. It allorvs us to think of policy nrakcrs as rational actors in a social
cnviroutlcnt and of (cnvironmcntal) policy nraking as a discoursc in its olvrt right,
a discor.rrsc rvith its own stanclarcls lor truth and rclevaltcy.
On this scconcl pcrspecti and in a pcssin"ristic rtrood 
- 
rvc miglit fincl
that policy makcrs arc burcaucrats or incrcurentalists, r,vhosc intcrcsts are llowcr,
status, l'noney, survival, ctc.,, rather than scrvicc to thc conrn-runity, and r,vhosc aint
it is 
- 
assunting tltcur to bc rational inclrviduals 
- 
to usc thc most cll-cctivc ancl
clficicnt lnealts availablc in order to satisÍy thosc intcrcsts. Thus, tlicir olttinral
solution to atr cnvirotrtncntal policy problcnr coulcl bc to institutc rcscarch ancl
ltlannirtg cottrtlittccs, choosc thc right pcoltlc to srt olt thcnt so as to assurc
turaxitnutt-t controvcrsy rvithin and alr-long conrnrittccs, cltsul'c thc ltroc'lLrction clf
tttutually contradictory reports aficr a long dclay. and tlicn drau,conclLrsiotrs that
rvould supltort a Ireccl Íor Íurthcr rcscarch, that lvould ltrolong thc necd Íbr
cttvirot-ttncntal policy makirtg, or would rcdcÍlnc issucs or discarcl thcnt as not or
no longcr politically or scicntiÍlcally rclcvant.
Tltc inte resting tliing about this sccortcl perspcctivc is that, i1'corrcct, it u,oulcl
not only bc consistcrrt rvith thc casc nradc by SPSK ancl postnroclenrisnr, but that
it is also still compatiblc rvith a scrics of inl'crcnccs that sLrltltort thc case of classic
cpistctnology.For startcrs, it nral<cs it possiblc to arsLlc (against SPSK) tltat ltolicy
tttal<crs, rc-tlardlcss of thcir llcrsolral or prolcssional agcltda, nray in thc long ntn
still ltavc to aclclress cnvironnrcntal problcnrs o.s' .suclr. 'l-hc political issuc Íbr rvhich
thcy havc bcctt askcd to clcsign solution stratcgics clcÍlncs thcir lrcld of opcration.
attcl no utattcr horv cliictt attcl hou, firnclanrcntally they rcc'lcflnc it, thcir succcss irr
aclticving thcir orvrt aitrs is ultinratcly clctcrnrinccl by horv tlicir pcrlbnlaltcc orl
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thc original issue is judged. Consequently, in addition to all thc smokcscreens and
diversions they lnay prepare, it is by thcir own bureaucratic logic prudential for
them to gather all relevant infonlatiori on the original issuc and design policies
that addrcss it adequately 
- 
just to be prepared. Outside influences (the political
systcm in particular) may even Íbrce them to irnplemcnt these policies. Now since
policy rnaking in general is an iterated galrlc, i.c., an activity that requircs repeated
co-opcration between policy rnakers and their surroundings, it is rational for policy
rnakers to actually irnplernent at lcast partly successful cnvirontncntal policies at
least part of the tirne, and to be able to explain as clearly as possible in all other
cases why no (better) policy could have bcen chosen. To paraphrasc Machiavelli,
the best way to cnsurc being perceived as a good prince (or policy rnakcr) is to
be one. As often as necessary. On an SPSK perspectivc thcn, no matter how
intrinsically uninterested policy makers may bc in thc issues they arc cxpected to
deal with and in dcsigning'good'policies frorl the point of vierv of outsiders (i.c.,
citizens and politicians), the structurc in r,vhich they operate logically obligates them
to pcrfonn as well as they can. It shoulcl of coursc be noted that this argurnent
presurxes that or-rtsidc forces are actually capable of controlling tlte policy rnaking
proccss condition that is often not n-rct (or casy to meet) in real lifc.
Secondly, an analysis of environrnental policy naking in terms of our cynical
second perspective allows ns to asscrt that policy urakers have art intrinsic intcrest
in gaining (from a bureaucratic perspcctivc) adcquatc knowledgc both about the
issr-rc at hand and about the nonnative criteria outsidc fbrces itnpose on them. If
rvc replace the aim ol' cnvironrncntal policy rnaking as solving environmcutal
problcrns by purcly bureaucratic aims, rvhat changcs is the kind of knowledge
policy makers requirc 
- 
and not its quality, i.e., its being rcliablc or approxirnating
truth. And this irr turn rnakes it possiblc to arguc, against post-rnodem vicws, that
policy rnakcrs n-rust be able to conrrnnnicatc with others, lcarn frour thcn and
tundcrstand the rules of thcir discoursc, just as much as these others will need to
bc ablc to cornmunicate with policy nrakers. As a mattcr o1'fact, policy urakers
do communicatc with politiciar-rs and cxpcrts at lcast in such a way that they can
bc said to import data and cxport rcsults. Thcy rnay or ntay not rcfer to thc
infbnnation thcy transfèr as 'truth', thcy l'nay cvcn rejcct othcls' points of vicws
as myths. Yct thc point is that r.vhatcvcr thcy conrmunicatc is atr intcrsubjectively
(intcrdiscursively) uselul commodity. Whether erll parties irrterprct data and results
in thc sauri: way or r,vhethcr thcir discourses urake them see diffcrent things is of
no coltsequcltcc: rvhat rnatters is that thcy think thcy understaud cach other,, act
Llllon this thought and secm ablc to rcpcat such processes without total disappoitttmcut.
Thirdly, regardlcss of whcthcr policy nrakers arc sclfislt rogucs or social
hcroes, they use inÍbnration originating in, and export infontratiott to, persons
involved in difÍ-erent discourses 
- 
the political and cthical discourscs as uruch as,
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if not morc than, scicntific discourses. This sr.lpports thc idca that although
scientific (and othcr) disciplines may bc discourses, evelt ttniverses in their own
right, therc is a quality to or property of thc cxchanged information it,velí'rathcr
than a property of thc context (discourse) that detcrmines, at least in part, whether
it can make scnse in different contexts.
Fourthly, our analysis providcs us with further circutlstantial evidencc against
postrnodernism. On a post-rnodcrn view, the existencc o1'policy diversity rvotrld
have to be explained by diffcrences bctwccn local policy discourses, other local
discourses and their interaction. For the last of thesc, llo ovcrarching conceptttal
framework of language, culture or logic is rcquircd, rnercly thc interpretation of
one pcrson's 'significants' (propositions) in terurs of onc discotrrsc as 'signifiablc'
phenornena by another person operating in accordance rvith thc rttlcs of another
discourse. From what rn'e have secn, howcvcr, wc can cottcludc tltat attotltcr
cxplanation is cqually wcll possiblc. On this account, it is not a dialogue bctrvcctt
the deaf rnutually signifying their significants as signifiablc, ltence au ovcrload oÍ'
inforrnation, that cxplains divcrsity, but rathcr thc abscrrcc of knorvlcdgc. As rvc
have seen, developing policy is not a straightl'onvard utattcr of pickirrg thc right
tool to do apre-ordained job. It is a lcarning proccss iu its own right, likc scicrrtillc
work, where thc locally available (cnrpirical, political and ethical) irrfbnr-ration
deterrnincs tl-re shapc of policies, and thror-rgh rvhich ncr.v infortrtatiotr calt be
gathered. On this view then, abscncc of and thc quest for inÍbntration arc
responsible for the phcnol"nenon of policy diversity.
Wc should then conclr.rdc at thc vcry lcast that therc catt bc artd ap1-rcars to
be comrnunication betwccn environmcr-rtal policy trakers and thcir ctrviroutrtct-tt, so
that discourses cannot bc totally sclf--sufficient systcurs. It nray bc that thc rLrlcs
for truth and relcvancy of two distinct discourses arc incortrpatiblc. thc fact rcmairts
that, to avoid thc tcrrn truth,'data'can bc exchanged as'ltropositions', hct-tcc
r-nutually understood, duc to a quality of thc data thentsclves. This is rtot to say
that wc can (or should) totally reject all idcas about ciiscoLtrscs. We havc scctr tltat
thcrc is some kind of cxchangc of information, not that the satnc irtlbnnatiort is
not treated diffcrcntly in diÍfcrcnt cotrtcxts. Thc sociologist of scicncc tlccds
information about scientific ziims. activitics aucl rcsults, but lic interprcts tltcrlt
differently than episten-rologists or naturnl scicntists. I3y tltc satrlc tokctr, policy
rnakcrs nced scientific data and scicntists trccd rcal-lif-c data to pcrÍbnrt thcir
scparatc jobs, but thcy rnay irttcrprct thcir clata ciiÍfcrently.
For the classic Grcck philosophcrs, prÍicticc or policy. sciettcc artcl philosophy
belonged together and requircd one anothcr to bc'.qoocl'. Policy lvas in-rpossiblc
without knowledgc olt cmpirical circutrstanccs ancl cthical critcria; scicttce rvas
impossible without a practical purposc and cthical guiclclirtes; philosoplry rvas tlrc
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lnost practical of all in bcing able to transfbru-r random acts into reasoned
behaviour. It seems that tiris is not how policy and scicnce,, let alonc otl-rer sphercs
of hr,unan activity, currcntly relate and interact. The policy makcr does not have
to bc scicntist or philosopher, he can simply work on the basis of data these others
supply. The saure applics to scientists and philosophers: they may or may not care
about the practical uscs of their work, or about what is politically relevant, and
they ruay or lray not rcflect upon philosophy, policy or sciencc 
- 
none of this
diminishes thc 'local' rclevancy of tlieir rvorl<.
The intcraction between policy, sciencc and philosophy uecd not cven bc
mutually advantageoLls. What n-ray bc rclcvant to thc scientist ruay be irrelevant
to thc other two, and vice vcrsa. (The scicntist's con'rplaint that contract research
fbr businesses is scldom scicntifically relcvant, or the student's cotnplaint about
thc abstractness and inconsequentiality of philosophy illustrate this vcry well.) Thc
best we can hope for is a relation of mutnal cxploitation: thc policy rnakcr takcs
Íion-r the available scientific data that which is n'rost rclevant fbr him, the scientist
looks at those aspccts o1'policics that rnakc scicntific scnsc. In a way, this rcally
is thc best relation possiblc: it allorvs each to opcrate in his own sphere and none
to dictatc others how to opcratc.
Data, scientiÍlc or othcrrvisc, arc likc nroney: to onc, lloltcy lncans powcr,
to anothcr Íbod, to a third odd littlc blinking bits of rnetal; to one, data rnean
busincss, to another undcrstanding, to a thirci totally usclcss drivel. This is truc
fbr policy in rclation to scicntiÍlc data, as wc saw, but also frorn the point of view
oÍ'onc scientiÍlc disciplinc in rclation to othcrs or to policy. Like policy in a strict
scltsc, scicnce is a mattcr of clfcctivcly and cfïciently using the right instrumcnts
to a givcn ainr. In the casc of scicncc, cf ficacy rs exprcssed in terms of prooÍ, of
conjccturcs and rcfutations, tcsts and vcriÍications; cfficiency in tcrt'us of for
ir-rstirncc Ockhanr's razor; instrurnents in tcrtns of hypotheses, logic and tcsts; the
aim in tcn'ns of a research question.
Most of thc scntantical ancl syntactical critcria by rvhich wc judgc a policy
carr bc appliccl, mtttcttís nrttturttli,s but rvithout any diÍficulty, to scientific research
- 
in fact, clcrnands to the cfl'cct that thcrc rnlrst bc critcria of succcss for a rcscarch
projcct and that thc projcct must bc so dcsigncd as to bc ablc to havc success,
or that thcrc should bc a standarcl Íbr aclcquacy (scicntific truth or validity) are
rather trivial, to say the lcast. Wliat rvoulcl bc less trivial is a clairn that scientific
rcscarcli, likc policy, r'r-rust bc moral in mcans atrd cnds, and that it tnr-rst be based on
nonlativc theories abor-rt thc rcscarch llcld or rescarch objcct. This particular claim
Inay not only open thc door to SPSK and postmodernistn, but rttay also bring back
black nrcurorics of thc clairn to supcriority of socially rclcvant, rcad socicty-critical,
rcad Marxist scicntiflc rcscarch. It rniiy also appcar to support the currcnt tcndcncy
to clcruand that scicntiflc rcscarch bc'useÍirl'. rcacl: clcnrand-scnsitivc and tnarketablc.
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I havc no intention of rcpeating the old and worn argumcnts used by any of
these parties. However, their existence as well as their effects on the development
of scientific discipline s and individual rescarch proiects shows that scien ce can be
guided by rnoral and political considerations. Thc point I would want to make, ancl
one does trot have to adherc to SPSK to acknowlcdge this, is that it also nzrsl be
guided by nortnative ideas 
- 
willy nilly. Scientific rcscarch is ncver rnincllessly
searching a dark room without corners for somcthing that may or lray not be therc.
It is always ernbeddcd in theories: theories about the research object, theories about
the links between object and field, theorics about the discipline in itsclf ancl in
rclation to others, theories about the relcvancy of a rcsearch question. Each of thcse
theories, particularly the last onc, contains normative eler-nents. It lvill not colrlc
as a surprisc that this is unavoidablc in thc social sciences, where background
theories dcscribe 'huntans' and 'society' as organic entities, as rational actors ancl
a co-opcrativc venture, as subjccts and the instrr-rmcr-rts of an elite, or whcrc the
first arc endowed with free will or seen as products of their environment. Albeit
less obvious,, the sal"ne is truc Íbr thc lnore'rratural' scienccs: background theorics
arc lir-rked to cver deeper theories 
- 
down to causality, the laws of gravity or
thcrnrodynatltics, etc. 
- 
all of which arc, as scierrtiÍic thcorics, basically uncertain.
The decision to accept such theorics, cvcn in the absencc of alternatives, is a
uortnativc choicc; thc decision to opt for spccific rcsearch questions is often onc
with practical and (hcnce) political inplications. If we want science to 'cxlrliiin'
phcnouena, thcn thc tnore it explains thc bctter it can be. Hence, bcing conscious
of thesc background theories and accounting Íbr thcm is bettcr than opcrating in
relative tltcoretical darkncss. Idcally thcn, good scicntiÍic rescarch recognises its
nortnativc assulxptions and is ablc to dcfcncl tltcnt. Note that this is a purcly fbnnal
conclttsion. It does not imply that scicnce must bc uscÍirl, critical or cnliglitcning;
thcre is no principal rcason why scicntists shoLrlcl not bc n-rovcd, partly or totally.
by purely scierttific lton-ns of rclcvartcy ancl purcly scientific rcasons for aclhcrinÍr
to background theories 
- 
provided thcse cxist.
Tltc comparisorr betwcen scicnce and policy shows that scicntific rescarcli is
cqually 'underdetertnined', to usc a Marxist phrasc. cqually dcpcndcr-rt or"r a thcory
of trutlt, on iuportcd data and on norrnativc guiclelir"res. Thc conclusion to dra,uv
from this is that sciencc treeds divcrsity as much as policy does. In abscncc oÍ'
norrnative truths and an ur-rdisputcd thcory oÍ'scientiÍ'ic tnrth,, it must bc divcrsc
and opclt as wcll as sceptical and self'-critical; its research questions canr-rot
arbitrarily bc lirnitcd to rvhat is expcctccl to be uscÍirl, nrarketablc or litrcrating.
It can leartr frotn expcriences gathcred in non-scicntillc contexts likc policy making,
but it is the scientist's research qucstion and its rclcvancy within the disciplirrc ancl
givcn its background thcories that dctcrminc thc rclcvancy o1'data 
- 
whatcvcr thcir
orisins.
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Section 4: Epistemology after postmodcrnism
Lct us rcturn norv to our point of departure. We discussed two typcs of critique
of classic episternology: SPSK and llostmodernism. Whercas the first cannot count
as a scrious thrcat to the epistcmological axiom that knowledge can be lnore or
less reliablc and that this can be tcstcd and supportcd in a 'context ofjustification'
rcgardless of its actual origins (the contcxt of discovery), postmodernism is lcss
casy to dcal with. The posttlodcrnist's claim is that the context of justification is
part of the background theories and rules of a spcciÍlc discourse or interprctation
scheurc. Hence, rlicrobiology has a context of justiÍ-rcation, sociology has one,
environt-ncntal policy has one, cthics has onc, and cach of thesc is ur-riqr-rc ancl
crcates its discourse-specific vcrsiorrs of truth. Any atten-rpt at interdiscursivc
colllrlultication is bound to fail: a dircct translatiori of a proposition p fi'on one
discoursc into thc language of anothcr creatcs a second proposition p' tliat sirlply
cannot lttcilll thc samc as li; any attcr-r-rpt at translation by rleans of a n-retadiscoLlrsc
me rcly adds anothcr discourse and a ncr,v translation 7.r ".If postrtrodcrnistl werc corrcct, rvc would cxpect corlrtrunication bct'rvecn
discor-rrses to be irnpossiblc. For tliis rcilsolt, wc took a closc look at thc
cnvironntcntal policy 'discoursc' and its rulcs for goocl policy rtrakirrg. What wc
lbund was, firstly, that thc cnvirouurcntal poiicy discoursc is (neccssarily) incompletc:
good policy rcquires tltc use oÍ'crtrpirical arrd moral-ltolitical infbnlation that trrc
discourse itse lf catrnot gcucratc. To bc operational, it needs to contrrunicate r.vith
othcr discourscs. Sccorrdly, cnvironmcntal policy nrakcrs actually usc infonnation
frotn external sourccs, and tltesc in turn lcanr or can lcanr frour expcricnce gathcrccl
irt thc implctncntation of e nvironmcntal policy: thcrc rs conturunication. Thirclly, it
appears to bc possiblc to gettcralisc our conclusions in the casc of er-rvironmeltal
policy rnaking to cvery discoursc in which (a pleonasnr:) knor,vlcdgc is used ancl
produced 
- 
that is, to all fonns of policy in the broad sense, inch-rding thc scienccs.
Thc questioti lvc must now ask is rvhethcr this can collnt as a refutation of
lrostrlrodcruisur. In the last sectiou, I alrciidy hintcd at an answcr: ycs ctnrl no. On
thc oltc ltand, wc havc idcntificd thc cxistcncc oÍ'a proltcrty oÍ"cliita'or
propositior-rs that allorvs them to servc as an interdiscursivcly transÍ-crablc con-rmodity.
Participants in differcnt discourses at lcast usc thc sAllc propositiotl p, beliette tl'tey
ttuderstauci eaclt other and bclicve thcy understand each other's lvay of producing
propositions. On tltc other ltancl, r.lonc of this necessalily contradicts the post-
-ttroderu clair-n that scientists, policy makcrs, cpistemologists and grocers livc in
clil'Í'ererrt univcrscs wherc thcy 'signify' thcir 'significants' according to thcir
specific discursivc rules and intcrprct 1hc sillne proposition or phenolncnolt diffcrently.
I{etrcc, 7-r is uroncy to onc and mud to another. Dcspite thc fact tl^nt p is transÍèrablc,
it car-r still at thc satnc time bc transfonnablc. The postmodcrnist will vchemcntlv
EPISTEIí8, ANO l, N." l, DEZ 97l.lAN 9ll l4l
r42
14ÁRCEL ITISSENBUIIG
dcfcnd the lattcr position, and thcre is littlc a classic cpisternologist can say in rcply.
Irr Poplterian temrs, thc idea that translatin g p in thc vocabulary of other discourses
necessarily involves transfbruration is imtnune to Íalsification. Sincc tutttual
understanding across thc borders of discourses is assutncd to be impossible, atty
two representatives of- differcnt discourses discussing p, claiming to bc truly
tunderstanding onc anothcr ancl exchanging argunrents are, itr post-modern cycs,
merely chcating thernselvcs. No urattcr horv loltg and clecply thcy talk, thcy rvill
continuc to talk at cross-purlloscs 
- 
thcy merely do not noticc it.
Whcre does this leave us in our attcnrpt to defcnd classic epistcu-tology? First:
in a position to turn the tablcs ollcc l'norc ancl show that eveu if postnroden-risnr
is correct, it cannot rcÍutc tl"re axiorns of classic cpisternology. If there is no rvay
to disprove that t'wo peoplc can discuss p without interprcting p in thc santc way,
then therc is also no way to provc it. Sccotrd: it lcavcs Lls in a positiou 'uvltcrc tltc
advocatc of classic epistemology nevcrtheless caunot aÍÏbrd to simply irxiotlatisc
thc cxistencc of a discourse-indepertdcnt quality to data.
Classic cpistcnrology cloes not havc to rc'jcct all post-modcrn claitls, ancl in
fact it should not. Yet it nrust rc-ject thc iclca that 7r ttccessarily trcans sorncthing
conrpletely diÍï-crent irr diff-ercnt cliscourscs, or clsc thcre is no rvay in which ri'c
calt cvcr say that knorvlcdge is nrorc or lcss rcliablc, that 7,l is truc or untruc, ltttcl
ltope to bc saying sonrcthing meaningful. If it canttot rc-icct this thcsis, any 7-r is
truc 
- 
to 1'rrovc its truth, all that is needcd is to construct a cotttcxt, a discoursc,
witli a sct of granrmatical ancl scr-nantical mlcs that ntakc 7r truc: 'cotrtextually'
true.
Wc havc to take thrce steps to savc thc idca of discourse-irrclepetrdent truth.
Thc Ílrst stcp is oltc wc liavc alrcacly takcn: rvc t-t-tust assulttc that titcrc arc trvo
aspccts to data or prol)ositiorrs. Orrc is tlic quality that ntiikcs tltcnt transf-crablc,
thc othcr thcir contcxtual urcauing. Postrttoclcnristt-t Íbcuses cltr this lattcr aspcct,
thc corrtcxt of r-ncaning, and ncglccts the f irst. Classic cpiste rtrology calt acccpt that
thcrc is such a thing as thc corrtcxt of tncattilrg, as tluclt as it catt lir.,c rvith thc
idea o1'a contcxt o1'discovcry. Alicr all, a proposition 7,l í1,;cl/ cloes not chaltgc
rrrcrcly bccausc it is írtÍu'ltrttetl diff-crclttly, turtrs out to bc totally or partly
irrclevant or at ocJds 'uvith acccptcd thcorics in othcr cliscourscs. Classic epistentology
calt cvclt, in a way, livc rvith thc idca that 7-l is truc ilt ctttc cliscoursc and rtutrttc
in another. To this purposc, wc tnust takc stcp tr,vo.
For a propositiorr to bc truc in onc discoursc ancl utttrttc itr auother, it is
ncccssary to acccpt a consistcncy irrterprctation o1'truth, i.c., the idca that a
propositior-r's lnrth clcpcnds orr thc rlcgrcc to lvlticlt it is consistent u,ith othcr
propositions in a givcn thcorctical Íianrcrvork 
- 
in this case, rvith thc rulcs attcl
thcorics of a spcciÍlc discoursc. Thus, thc proposition'tltcrc arc too lt-lalty pcoltlc'
can bc truc in the contcxt of thc cnvirontncrttal policy cliscoursc, ltroviclcci thc lattcr
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acknor,vlcdgcs e.g. that rcsources are physically scarce. The sau-re proposition is
nccessarily untruc in a fur-rdamentalist Christian discourse, whct'c 'go forth ancl
multiply' is part of thc vested theory and thc vcsted theory is axion-ratically the
standard of truth. Purcly pragrlatically spcaking, cvcn a correspondencc theory of
truth (i.e., 7-r is true if and only if /, corrcsponds with known ernpirical facts) is
cornpatible with thc consistcncy theory. correspondcnce betwcen p and our idcas
about thc 'rcal' rvorld comcs dorvn to compatibility betrvccnp and other propositions
(1, t' as rnuch as consistency betwccrt p and the Biblc con'rcs dorvn to
correspondcncc between p and the rcal rvorlcl of the Biblc.
Lastly, wc havc to cou-rc up rvith an altcrnativc to thc theory that (a) truth
is purcly context-dependcnt and (b) thc transfcrability of sonrc propositior.r p to
othcr discourscs is a pure coincidcncc. Tlic altcrnative nrust thclt support t'wo iclcas:
(a) that, regardlcss of tlie trurth thcory wc aclhcrc to, therc is sonrething about p
that is truc in a sense different fiom contextual (discoursc-dcpcndent) truth and (b)
that tlicrc is a sense irr which any /, is ncccssarily tnrc or untruc re galdless of thc
contcxt of a discoursc.
Nolv thc history of cpistcurology abounds rvith thcorics supporting suclr
claims. Aristotclian and Kantian scliools, Íbr cxan'rplc, rclcr to irtborn propcrtics
oÍ'nrankind that predcstine any liuman bcing to follorv thc san-tc rulcs of otrscn'atiorr,
intcrpretatior-r and argumcntation, thus ensr.rring conrplctcly conrmensurablc basic
data. In thc tradition of thc Wiencr Krcis, it is possiblc to arguc that basic, aton"ric
or clcrncntary propositions cxist, propositions that arc cither unarnbigtrously true
or unanrbiguously falsc and that cannot bc lirrthcr rcclucecl to urorc clcurcntary
propositions. Thc problcur u,ith nrost o1'thcsc thcorics is that thcy nray stili bc
vulnerablc to thc postmodcrnist's ob.jcction oÍ' 'crcating' a distinction betrvccn
tmtli and untruth only by using LrndcÍ-cndcd prior rulcs 1'or thc rclcvancy ol'
propositions.
Tlie post-rnodenr objection is directcd against 'impcrialist' clairns rnadc or-r
bchalf of thc semantics of spccific, particularly scientific, cliscourscs. It loscs its
forcc in thc casc of a thircl typc of thcory, according to which 7r is transfcrablc
and lias a contcxt-ovcrarching validity cluc to 1he existcrtcc of logical consistcncy
betweerr thc proposition and thc grentmut'of cliscoLlrscs. IJctrcc, Tr will not dcrivc
its inter-discursivc'truth'viiluc Íiom its contcnt but 1'rot'r-t its aclaptability to
othcr discourscs. This tclls us littlc about r,vhcthcr or notp is actually trr.rc: tmth
rcmains contcxt-dependerrt. Yet it still helps us conrparc ancl cvaluatc distinct
discourscs.
On thc gramnratical vierv, it is not thc (scicntific or otlier) tmth of ciata that
helps to refutc, Sill, astrology but the inability of thc lattcr to incorporatc data.
Astrology, fbr instancc, cannot dcal with thc conccpt of a relativcly inclcpcndcnt
actor or agcnt 
- 
r.vhethcr hurnan or chcmical. It knows only slzrvcs to thc stars.
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The rlore data a theory (discourse) can incorporate, the bctter it would sccru to
be. This is or-rc view postrnodcrnism cannot rcjcct without rcjecting the idea that
any thcory, postrnodcmism included, tlust at least be opcn to logical analysis. If
it does reject this idea,, it becornes lneanirrgless srnall talk. If it does trot, it has
rnade itsclf superfluous. We do not need postmodernistn to be rcminded of the basic
question in episternology: how is knowledge possible'/ It appears then that tlterc
is still work to be found for Williar-n Ockhalrl's Íazor.
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